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In his Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and Power Richard Miller establishes a 
thesis about global justice that should have been obvious for a long time. Miller doesn’t 
approach issues of global justice from the Shallow Pond case, but instead from the 
historical realities of how cultures, societies, and now global society work. The Shallow 
Pond case is this: Suppose, as you’re walking to a not too important meeting, that you 
notice a child drowning in a shallow pond. You quickly realize that if you do nothing, the 
child will die, but if you do try to save the child, you’ll be successful and yet ruin some of 
your clothes and be late to your meeting, costing you some extra money. Many offer the 
case as a way of arguing for stringent obligations to the world’s poor. Although Miller 
does not rely on such an analysis, his book’s very rich historical and sociological analysis 
comes to a somewhat similar conclusion concerning obligations to the world’s poor. Any 
budding philosopher can only hope to strive for such important interdisciplinary research 
in forming philosophical positions. 
 
I take Miller’s thesis to be two-fold, and something like this: 1) There are 
stringent, unmet moral responsibilities to those in developing countries, and such 
responsibilities are possessed by individuals, organizations, and the major overseeing 
political entities of developed countries, in particular the U.S. 2) Such obligations to the 
impoverished in developing countries is not due to the bases provided by either i) Peter 
Singer and allies in their beneficence and sacrifice models of justice, or ii) Thomas Pogge 
and his allies in their no-harm due to economic interdependency model of justice. 
Instead, as Miller advances, individuals in developing countries are owed reparations in 
virtue of the fact that they have been taken advantage of by developed countries. 
Furthermore, as individuals in any developed country, we have the obligation to make 
sure that we treat those in developing countries in such a way that we do not take 
advantage of them. More specifically, we have the obligation not to exploit them. 
 
In terms of the first thesis, that we have largely unmet moral obligations to those 
in developing countries, it is via his argument for the second thesis that this is 
established. Now, some might object that a separate argument for this first thesis should 
be given, independent of argument for the second thesis. But this would be a mistake. 
Suppose that the only way to argue for a metaethical thesis was by arguing for an ethical 
theory. For example, one argued for some form of ethical realism by arguing for 
utilitarianism. Then, such arguments for utilitarianism would also be arguments for 
ethical realism. Now, in terms of his second thesis, Miller argues that Singer and 
company as well as Pogge and company do not provide the correct basis for unmet 
obligations to the world’s poor. I believe he is correct here. For example, Singer does not 
allow for deviation of projects that are not aligned with aid. Just think of what we do with 
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our money and time for those close to us that is out of proportion with helping and just 
being with those close to us; according to Singer, this kind of action would be morally 
prohibited. But of course it is not, nor should it be. In terms of Pogge and company, 
Miller focuses on their reliance to ground moral obligations of individuals of developed 
nations based on their economic interdependency with individuals of developing nations. 
However, as Miller argues, such economic interdependency lacks a way to ground such 
obligations. Miller reminds us that such obligations are moral, and as such, the basis for 
them needs to be moral as well. This can be highlighted by the fact that multinational 
enterprises can actually raise, just slightly, the level of income of individuals in 
developing countries, and yet in doing so still exploit them. 
 
Despite the very important critical work on Miller’s behalf, I think that there is a 
fundamental methodological problem with it. In making his case, Miller argues for what 
he calls ‘The Principle of Sympathy’. Miller doesn’t think that by itself this principle will 
get the result of stringent, unmet responsibilities to the global poor. Instead, he thinks that 
i) it is the correct contrast to what he calls ‘The Principle of Sacrifice’ as offered by 
Singer, and ii) it shows that if there are such things as stringent, unmet obligations to the 
global poor, it has to do with our fundamental moral (not economic) interactions with 
them. Now, Singer’s Principle of Sacrifice would easily ground stringent obligations to 
the global poor, as making such sacrifices on our part would easily make things much 
easier for them. Miller’s Principle of Sympathy, on the surface of it, would not require as 
much sacrifice. Yet, as Miller argues (although not very explicitly), such a principle does 
require more sacrifice on our part than we would initially think. Here is where the 
methodological worry comes in: For Miller, the Principle of Sympathy does not require 
sacrifice per se, nor does it require equal concern, but it does require equal respect. While 
this sounds great, it is far from clear what, in principle, equal respect requires. It may be 
obvious that a multinational enterprise paying $1.80/hr in a country with average wage of 
$.60/hr is not disrespecting persons, especially when the working times are no more than 
10 hrs/day and the work is not health-threatening. But it is more contentious when it is 
$1.00/hr for 12 hrs/day for 16 years olds in possibly health-threatening conditions in a 
country whose average wage is $.60/hr. Miller doesn’t discuss the possible differences 
between these two cases. 
 
Now, this might be due to his reliance on the veil of ignorance. He should not be 
singled out for this fault. No one published I know of has used the veil of ignorance in 
such a way that does more than propose vague principles. Couldn’t it be used for specific 
cases instead? In fact, if there were a ‘Part 2’ to Miller’s book, this could be just the 
subject for it to address. How, behind a veil of ignorance, would affected parties—or 
perhaps, all parties?—come to an agreement concerning specific cases involving global 
issues of morality? And what would their agreement, if any, be? These are important 
questions. Merely appealing to the veil of ignorance does not do the required explanatory 
work. Instead, studying the veil of ignorance itself is required, so that we can know what 
can and cannot be ‘deduced’ from the veil. We know at least so far that there is still an 
unresolved tension between how Harsanyi intended the veil of ignorance and Rawls’ use 
of it. Thus, I think that further work in understanding the veil of ignorance would be 
interesting and perhaps even be fruitful in making Miller’s case more decisive. 
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Despite my criticisms, I want to emphasize the importance of Miller’s work. 
Among other things, through his extensive study of the research done on the Iraq War, 
the reader will see how the U.S., the paradigm controlling developed country, has done 
things to maintain its power, things considerably out of proportion with the demands of 
global justice. Thank you Richard Miller for articulating this point with empirical and 
conceptual power! 
 
I conclude by emphasizing again the importance of what could be accomplished 
at the theoretical level using a veil of ignorance. The veil is frequently mentioned by 
Miller but is never expanded upon. Given the current state of the world and my ignorance 
of my own position and identity in it, what would I choose? This seems to be a fruitful 
way of basing moral obligations of the global rich to the global poor. There are many 
economic and sociological facts and ‘laws’ that would have to be known for one to 
responsibly employ the veil. I suspect that use of such a veil would garner the same very 
stringent, unmet obligations Miller strives for. With Miller, we need to move beyond 
mere analogous appeals to Shallow Pond, and look toward our world with deeper 
understanding of our social and political relationships. But if the veil of ignorance is the 
methodological tool by which to make such progress, then is a methodological tool that 
requires further investigation. 
 
Joel Dittmer 
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
